We develop a dynamic model in which a firm exercises an option to expand production on either a small or large scale with cash reserves and costly external funds. We show that the financing costs greatly distort the firm's financing and investment behavior and result in a policy contingent on the dynamics of the cash flow and reserves. Most notably, we prove that an intermediate level of cash reserves is likely to accelerate investment in the small-scale project by interactions among financing costs, investment timing, and investment sizing. Our results fill the gap between two types of results: (i) empirical findings in a U-shaped relation between the investment volume and internal funds, and (ii) empirical predictions of a U-shaped relation between the investment timing and internal funds. JEL Classifications Code: G13; G31; G32.
Introduction
Subsequent to the departures from Modigliani and Miller (1958) 's irrelevance proposition in a frictionless market, there has been a long tradition in corporate finance to investigate the effects of various frictions on financing and investment decisions. Recently, an increasing number of papers have analyzed not only the static but also the dynamic behaviors of corporate financing and investment in the presence of frictions. 1 Among these, a real options approach plays an important role in unveiling investment timing decisions in the presence of such frictions as liquidity constraints (Boyle and Guthrie (2003) ), shareholders-debtholders conflicts (Mauer and Sarkar (2005) , Sundaresan and Wang (2007) ), and asymmetric information (Grenadier and Wang (2005) , Shibata and Nishihara (2010) Morellec and Schürhoff (2011) , and Grenadier and Malenko (2011) ).
We extend this line of research by revealing the interactions of costs of external financing, investment timing, and investment size. The model is as follows: A firm owns an option to expand production on either a small or large scale, where the price of the output follows a geometric Brownian motion. The investment project is financed with cash reserves and costly external funds. The firm's cash reserves gradually increase as the firm's existent production generates cash flows. If the firm waits for a sufficient level of cash reserves for each project, the investment project can be financed entirely with cash reserves. Otherwise, the firm must rely partially on costly external financing. For the small-scale expansion, the sufficient cash level is lower than that of for the large-scale expansion. Considering the trade-off, the firm determines its financing, investment timing, and investment sizing policy.
As in the standard real options literature (e.g., McDonald and Siegel (1986) , Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ), our model assumes the irreversibility of investing as a friction. A key difference from most of the related papers is that we incorporate the investment sizing decision in addition to the investment timing decision. The assumption of either a smallor large-scale choice builds on Dixit (1993) and Décamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006) . Indeed, our model generalizes their models to a case with costs of external financing. The financing costs are known as one of the most influential frictions in the corporate finance literature (e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) , ). According to the pecking order hypothesis, asymmetric information problems associated with external funding generate higher costs; therefore, managers prefer internal over external financing (Myers (1984) , Myers and Majluf (1984) ). As a proportional cost accounts for the largest part of external financing costs, we focus primarily on the case with a proportional cost.
Before describing the results, we emphasize a contribution of this paper from the theoretical viewpoint. Most of the related papers demonstrate their results only by numerical examples because the model's complexity precludes analytic results (e.g., Boyle and Guthrie (2003) , Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010a) , Shibata and Nishihara (2012) ).
Contrasted to the stream of literature, this paper analytically proves the interesting properties of the dynamic corporate financing and investment policy by developing techniques in the mathematical finance literature (e.g., Broadie and Detemple (1997) , Detemple (2006) , Bobtcheff and Villeneuve (2010) ) into a case involving a non-convex payoff and a non-geometric Brownian motion.
The results are summarized as follows. The presence of financing costs, unlike previous results with no financing cost in Décamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006) , leads the firm to take a financing and investment policy contingent not only on the cash flow dynamics but also on the cash reserves dynamics. Specifically, higher financing costs enhance the firm's incentive to wait for a sufficient level of cash reserves and use entirely internal financing, especially for the small-scale project.
The investment threshold for the large-scale project monotonically decreases with cash reserves. This monotonic relation is straightforwardly consistent with conventional views of underinvestment due to financing constraints. On the other hand, the investment region for the small-scale project is not monotonic with cash reserves. The small-scale investment is encouraged with cash reserves until cash reserves reach the investment cost and, after that, the investment is discouraged with cash reserves. The rationale behind the non-monotonic relation is that the firm optimizes not only investment timing but also investment size. Consider the ratio of the total cost associated with the large-scale expansion to that of the small-scale expansion. The ratio, which changes with cash reserves, is maximized when cash reserves are equal to the amount of the small-scale investment cost.
Indeed, at that moment the small-scale project requires no external funds while the largescale project requires a great amount of external funds. The greatest advantage of the small-scale project over the large-scale project plays a role in speeding up the small-scale investment at the intermediate level of cash reserves.
Most notably, our results can link two significant results in corporate finance. The first one is a U-shaped relation between the investment volume and internal funds. Since arguments among Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) , Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Hubbard (1998) , investment-cash flow sensitivities have been the center of attention in corporate finance. In particular, recent empirical evidence regarding this issue documented that the investment volume does not necessarily decrease with internal funds but can have a U-shaped relation with internal funds (Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007), Guariglia (2008) ).
The second result is an empirical prediction that the investment threshold has a Ushaped relation with a degree of financial constraints. The prediction has been seen in the recent real option literature. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) examined the effects of a liquidity constraint to the investment timing decision and predicted that the investment threshold has a U-shaped relation with a degree of the liquidity constraint. Shibata and Nishihara (2012) , who examined the effects of a debt capacity constraint in a dynamic financing and capital structure model, showed that the investment threshold has a U-shaped relation with a degree of the debt capacity constraint. 2 If one identifies "earlier" investment as "increased" investment, the two results are inconsistent with each other. However, this argument pays no attention to the point that the investment timing studies consider fixed-scale investment models. Our results can explain both types of results in terms of the interactions of investment timing and sizing decisions with costly external financing. In the presence of financing costs, cash reserves influence the trade-off between the two choices: small-or large-scale expansion. When cash reserves are close to the amount of the small-scale investment cost, the firm has a great incentive to invest in the small-scale project for which the investment threshold is relatively low. When cash reserves are much higher or lower than that level, the firm is likely to undertake the large-scale expansion for which the investment threshold is relatively high. This mechanism can explain U-shaped relations regarding both the investment volume and timing in the previous studies.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are threefold. First and most importantly, this paper fills the gap between two types of results in the corporate finance literature: (i) empirical evidence regarding a U-shaped relation between the investment volume and internal funds and (ii) predictions of a U-shaped relation between the investment timing and internal funds. Second, this paper complements the investment timing and sizing literature by proving that costs of external financing greatly distort the decision, leading especially to a policy dependent the dynamics of both cash flow and cash reserves. Third, this paper contributes the mathematical finance literature by proving the properties of exercise regions of an optimal stopping problem involving a non-convex payoff function and a non-geometric Brownian motion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup and the results in the case without financing costs. Section 3 presents the results in the case with a proportional cost and explains empirical implications. Section 4 examines the comparative statics with respect to the price volatility and a case with fixed and proportional costs in numerical examples. Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs appear in the appendix.
2 Regarding the relation between the investment timing and cash holdings, Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010b) , who extended Boyle and Guthrie (2003) to a case with financing costs, pointed out the possibility of various non-monotonic relations, and Nishihara and Shibata (2011) proved that a fixed cost of external financing leads to a non-monotonic relation.
Preliminaries

Setup
Consider a risk-neutral firm that produces a commodity at a constant rate. The output is sold at the market price X(t), which follows a geometric Brownian motion
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion defined in a probability space (Ω, F, P) and µ, σ(> 0) and x(> 0) are constants. For convergence, we assume that r > µ, where r is a positive and constant interest rate. Assume that the firm owns an option to expand production on either a small or large scale, A 1 (> 1) or A 2 (> A 1 ), respectively, at any time. If the small-scale (large-scale) growth option is exercised at time τ , the firm pays a fixed investment cost at time τ and receives an instantaneous cash flow
after time τ . Assume that the investment cost is I 1 (> 0) (I 2 (> I 1 )) for the small-scale (large-scale) expansion if the whole amount of the cost is internally financed. If part of the investment cost is externally financed, the firm pays a proportional cost C(≥ 0) of external financing. The total cost associated with the investment is expressed as
, where Y (τ ) denotes the firm's cash reserves at time τ .
Until the investment time τ , cash reserves Y (t) follow
where y(≥ 0) is a constant representing the initial cash reserves. Note that Y (t) is an increasing process. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) assume the dynamics of cash reserves exogenously and consider an option to initiate a new project. In contrast, we relate cash reserves Y (t) to operating cash flows X(t) more directly and consider the option to expand production.
In the case of C = 0, the setup corresponds to an alternative investment model studied in Dixit (1993) and Décamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006) . For a comprehensive list of typical situations fitting the standard model, refer to Dixit (1993) , Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , and Décamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006) . We extend the standard model, which presumes that the firm needs no costs of external financing (otherwise, it has sufficient internal funds), to a model involving costs of external financing. Unlike Boyle and Guthrie (2003) , who focused on a liquidity constraint in fixed-size investment, we examine the interactions of investment timing, size, and financing costs. 3
Our assumption of costly external financing is justified as follows. In the pecking order theory, agency and asymmetric information problems cause costs of external financing, 3 Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010b) extended Boyle and Guthrie (2003) to a case involving both a liquidity constraint and financing costs. Nishihara and Shibata (2011) developed a model involving financing costs, whereas Shibata and Nishihara (2012) focused on a debt issuance constraint. However, these papers assume fixed-scale investment.
which leads to a preference for internal over external finance (Myers (1984) , Myers and Majluf (1984) 
Case with no financing costs
As a benchmark, this section explains results in the case of C = 0. In this case, the firm solves the following problem:
where T denotes the set of all stopping times and
In (3), τ represents the time to expand the scale of production, whereas max i=1,2 E τ,X(τ ) [·] represents the sizing choice at time τ . By the strong Markov property of X(t), (3) can be reduced to Indeed, we have V 0 (x) depending on the relation of A 1 , A 2 , I 1 and I 2 as follows:
4 For this type of problem, refer also to Nishihara and Ohyama (2008) .
where
(< 0) is positive and negative characteristic roots, respectively. Threshold
}, which is equal to the threshold for an option to invest only in the small-scale project. On the other hand, thresholds x * 21 and x * 22 are determined by the value matching (continuous fit) conditions at the boundaries.
In this case, the problem is reduced to a problem of investing only in the large-scale project because the value (5) dominates the value of the small-scale investment, (
Note that β/(β − 1) monotonically increases with σ because of ∂β/∂σ < 0. A higher σ is more likely to lead to the case of {(
The intuition is that a higher σ increases the value of the large-scale growth option so that the value (5) can dominate (A 1 − 1)x/(r − µ) − I 1 for all x > 0. For details, refer to Décamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006) . We also note that
} the value by the initial sizing choice ,
where in the left-hand side the sizing decision i ∈ {1, 2} is F τ -measurable, while in the right-hand side i ∈ {1, 2} is F 0 -measurable. Dixit (1993) focused only on the right-hand problem, and Décamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006) complemented his argument by solving the left-hand problem. Because of the difference, in general we have the inequality (6). However, the equality
holds for x ≤ x * 1 . This means that, if the initial value X(0) = x is sufficiently low, this problem is unchanged from the case in which the firm chooses the investment size not dynamically but at the initial time.
Analytic Results
Model solutions
This section provides analytic results in the case of C > 0. In this case, the growth option value, denoted by V C (x, y), is expressed as
where where
The term C max(I i − Y (τ ), 0) represents that a proportional cost is required when the firm is short of cash reserves, whereas max i=1,2 (·) means that the firm chooses the optimal size at the investment time τ .
First, we prove several properties of the option value V C (x, y). Consider the following problems as approximations of V C (x, y):
V L (x, y) is the same type of problem as V 0 (x) so that it allows an explicit solution like (4) or (5). By the strong Markov property of X(t), we can easily show
holds, which means that the growth option will be never exercised.
Note that in both V L (x, y) and V U (x, y) the exercise policies are independent of Y (t).
The following proposition indicates that V L (x, y) and V U (x, y) are closed-form bounds of
Proposition 1 (Option value)
Proposition 1 states that, once Y (t) reaches the large-scale investment cost I 2 , the problem with financing costs is reduced to that of no financing cost. We will also use the following lemma to show the properties of the optimal financing and investment policy.
Lemma 1
holds for any positive constant ∆.
Next, we concentrate on the exercise regions for the problem (8). The standard argument proves that the exercise region of the option is expressed as
Furthermore, the exercise region S C can be decomposed into disjoint sets (some may be empty) defined by
The regions S C,1,E and S C,1,I represent small-scale investment regions partially with external financing and entirely with internal financing, respectively, whereas S C,2,E and S C,2,I represent large-scale investment regions partially with external financing and entirely with internal financing, respectively. Below, we analytically prove the interesting properties of S C,1,E , S C,1,I , S C,2,E , and S C,2,I . It immediately follows from Proposition 1 that the exercise regions coincide with those of V 0 (x) for y ≥ I 2 . Note that thresholds x * 1 , x * 21 , x * 22 , and x * 2 were explained in Section 2.2.
Proposition 2 (Case of sufficient cash reserves)
Now, we examine the properties of the exercise regions in the region y < I 2 . In this region, the optimal policy is contingent on a combination of X(t) and Y (t), and, hence, it is quite different from the threshold policy depending only on X(t) in the region y ≥ I 2 .
The following proposition reveals the properties of the large-scale investment partially with external financing, S C,2,E . Note that the region of the large-scale investment entirely with internal financing, S C,2,I , is explicitly derived in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 (Large-scale expansion)
where x * C (·) is a continuous and monotonically decreasing function. x * C (y) is between the corresponding thresholds in V L (x, y) and V U (x, y), and lim y↑I 2 x * C (y) is equal to the maximum of x * 2 (or x * 22 ) and (C + 1)rI 2 /(A 2 − C − 1). Otherwise, S C,2,E = ∅.
Here we limit our attention to a case in which a proportional cost is relatively low, i.e.,
A 2 −C −1 > 0. We will explain the case of A 2 −C −1 ≤ 0 below Proposition 6. In the case of A 2 − C − 1 > 0, the firm invests in the large-scale investment partially with external financing when the output price X(t) exceeds the threshold x * C (Y (t)). Proposition 3 ensures monotonicity in the lager-scale investment threshold x * C (Y (t)) with respect to cash reserves Y (t). This monotonicity can be straightforwardly explained as follows. An increase in Y (t) decreases a financing cost C(I − Y (t)), which accelerates the large-scale investment.
We now examine the properties of the small-scale investment regions, S C,1,E and S C,1,I . 
Proposition 5 (Small-scale expansion)
If (x, y) ∈ S C,1,E , (x, I 1 ) ∈ S C,1,I and (x, y ′ ) ∈ S C,1,E holds for any y ′ ∈ [y, I 1 ). {I 2 + C(I 2 − I 1 )}/I 1 . This demonstrates that costs of external financing can trigger the small-scale investment which is never undertaken in the case with no financing costs. This also suggests the counter-intuitive effect that financing costs may speed up investment (but it is small-scale).
We can prove the following proposition regarding the possibility of external financing.
Proposition 6 (Possibility of external financing)
If C < A 1 − 1, S C,1,E may not be empty and S C,2,E ̸ = ∅.
It is clear that high financing costs prevent a firm from financing the project with external funds. Further, and more interestingly, this proposition suggests that the firm is more likely to rely on external funds in the large-scale expansion than in the small-scale expansion. To see this, suppose that the cost of external financing is intermediate, i.e., A 1 − 1 ≤ C < A 2 − 1. In this case, the small-scale project is always deferred until the project can be financed entirely with internal funds. On the other hand, the large-scale project is undertaken partially with external financing when X(t) reaches a sufficiently high level. The reasoning is as follows. In the region Y (t) < I 1 , the firm receives cost savings of CX(t)dt + r(1 + C)I 1 dt and loses (A 1 − 1)X(t)dt by deferring the small-scale investment by an infinitesimally short period dt. Then, the firm never finances the smallscale project with external funds for any X(t) if C ≥ A 1 − 1 is satisfied. In the case of the large-scale project, the positive effect CX(t)dt remains unchanged, 5 while the negative effect is enlarged to (A 2 − 1)X(t)dt. This increases the firm's incentive to access external financing in the large-scale expansion.
Empirical implications
In this subsection, we provide empirical implications obtained from the propositions in Section 3.1 and clarify our contributions to the literature. When I 2 /I 1 (or (A 1 −1)/(A 2 −1)) is sufficiently low, i.e., in the first column, the financing and investment policy is the same as that of the case with only the large-scale project (fixed-scale investment model). This case is studied in details by Nishihara and Shibata (2011) , and, hence, we omit the explanation. The second and third columns present more interesting panels, in which the firm optimizes the investment size as well as investment timing. The panels show that costs of external financing bring many differences from the case with no financing constraint in Section 2.2 (refer also to Décamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006)). Among all, a key difference is regarding the necessity of dynamically deciding the investment size. Except for Panel (ix) the firm cannot determine the investment size at the initial time even if the initial value X(0) = x is low. The firm invests in either the small-or large-scale project depending on the dynamics of (X(t), Y (t)). Recall that in Section 2.2 the dynamic choice is not necessary for a sufficiently low X(0) = x.
Our results complement Dixit (1993) and Décamps, Mariotti, and Villeneuve (2006) by revealing the significance of the firm's dynamic sizing choice in the presence of costs of external financing.
Next, we clarify a significant contribution to the corporate finance literature. In corporate finance, there have been long-term arguments about sensitivities of investment to cash flow since seminal works by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) , Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , and Hubbard (1998) Boyle and Guthrie (2003) showed that the investment threshold has a U-shaped relation with a degree of a liquidity constraint because of a firm's incentive to avoid the risk of a cash shortfall. Shibata and Nishihara (2012) showed that a firm's consideration of the optimal capital structure leads to a U-shaped relation between the investment threshold and a debt capacity constraint. If "hastened" investment is equal to "increased" investment, the prediction from the real options literature is contrary to the empirical evidence.
However, this argument is not precise because the investment timing studies consider fixed-scale investment models. Indeed, by integrating both investment timing and sizing problems, we can demonstrate that the two results do not conflict but complement each other. cash reserves provides the greatest incentive for the firm to undertake the small-scale expansion rather than the large-scale expansion. Then, from the viewpoint of investment 7 In other cases, our model can also explain the conventional results, i.e., the monotonic relations regarding the investment volume and timing. In the real options literature, Milne and Robertson (1996) , Nishihara and Shibata (2010) , and Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010a) are in line with the monotonicity. size, the investment is scaled down from the first-best level of a case with no financing cost. At the same time, from the viewpoint of investment timing, the investment takes place earlier than the first-best timing because the small-scale investment has a lower value of the deferring option than that of the large-scale investment. Unlike Boyle and Guthrie (2003) and Shibata and Nishihara (2012) , by the interaction of financing costs, investment timing, and investment size, we can explain both non-monotonic relations regarding the investment volume and timing. This mechanism fills the gap between the investment volume and timing literature.
Lastly, we explain a contribution to the literature from a technical viewpoint. This paper, unlike most of the related papers relying on numerical simulations, attains analytic results. Although some of the techniques used in the proof are inspired by the mathematical finance literature (e.g., Broadie and Detemple (1997) , Detemple (2006) , Bobtcheff and Villeneuve (2010)), several developments are attained by this paper. 8 While the mathematical finance studies investigated the exercise regions of American options that involve a multi-dimensional geometric Brownian motion, the stochastic process Y (t) in our model is not a geometric Brownian motion; instead, it is defined by (2). Furthermore, the payoff function of problem (8) is not convex, which makes the proofs more difficult. These technical developments can be potentially applied to a variety of investment timing and sizing problems.
Numerical examples
As mentioned in Section 1, the main contribution of this paper is to attain analytic results regarding the firm's optimal financing and investment policy in Section 3. We supplement the results from two aspects in numerical examples. Section 4.1 presents the comparative statics results with respect to the output price volatility σ. Section 4.2 we present the results in a case with a fixed cost in addition to a proportional cost of external financing.
Base case
We explore the effects of output price uncertainty to the financing and investment policy.
The base parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.07, µ = 0.03, σ = 0.2, I 1 = 50, I 2 = 100, A 1 = 1.385, A 2 = 1.5, C = 0.1.
For comparison, we set the parameter values for the large-scale expansion at the same values as Nishihara and Shibata (2011) . These parameter values are also similar to those of the standard real options literature.
8 Nishihara and Shibata (2011) developed similar techniques to prove the properties of the optimal financing and investment policy in the presence of a proportional cost of external financing, but they assumed a fixed investment size.
For the base parameter values (13), we have {(A 2 − 1)/(A 1 − 1)} β/(β−1) = 1.9569 < I 2 /I 1 = 2 regarding the possibility of the small-scale expansion (Proposition 4). This means that the firm may undertake the small-scale investment. We also have C = 0.1 < A 1 − 1 = 0.285 regarding the possibility of external financing (Proposition 6). This means that the projects may be financed partially with external financing. In the computation, we make a tri-nomial lattice model that approximates to a geometric Brownian motion
(1), and we use a value function iteration algorithm.
[Insert Figure 4 about here.] Figure 4 plots the exercise regions with varying levels of σ. We can see from Figure 4 that a higher σ decreases the exercise regions, which implies that the investment threshold and the option value enhance with σ. This volatility effect is straightforwardly consistent with the standard results with neither financing costs nor sizing choice.
Further and more notably, Figure 4 demonstrates that the volatility effect is stronger for the small-scale investment than for the large-scale investment. As σ increases up to 0.2, the region of the small-scale investment partially with external financing, S C,1,E , disappears first. As σ increases up to 0.25, the region of the small-scale investment entirely 
Extension to a case with fixed and proportional costs
So far we have concentrated on a proportional cost of external financing because a proportional cost accounts for the greatest part of financing (e.g., ).
However, according to , the effects of a fixed cost may be observable for small firms. To check the robustness, we present a case with both fixed and proportional costs of external financing.
[Insert Figure 5 about here.] Figure 5 illustrates the exercise regions in the extended case with varying levels of σ. In the numerical examples, the fixed cost is set at 1. This means that the total financing cost is equal to 0.1 max
, where 1 {·} denotes the indicator function.
For Y (t) ↑ I i , a fixed cost provides the greatest incentive for the firm to wait and invest entirely with internal funds. Then, the firm never invests when Y (t) reach nearly I 1 = 50 or I 2 = 100, which leads to disconnected exercise regions. This fixed cost effect is documented in Nishihara and Shibata (2011) 
Conclusion
This paper examined the interactions of financing costs, investment timing, and investment sizing in a dynamic model. We assumed that a firm can invest in either a smallor large-scale project with cash reserves, which are increasing with time, and external funds that require a proportional cost. We, unlike most of the related papers, analytically proved the properties of the corporate financing and investment policy. The results are summarized as follows.
Financing costs lead to the financing and investment policy strongly contingent on the dynamics of both the cash flow and reserves. In particular, in the presence of financing costs, the firm is more likely to invest in the small-scale project entirely using internal 
A Proof of Proposition 1
Since Y (t) monotonically increases from the initial value y, we have
The problem (8) can be reduced to the problem with no financing cost when y ≥ I 2 .
B Proof of Lemma 1
First, we prove (9). Note that E 1 [·] represents the expectation with X(t) starting from X(0) = 1. For any positive constant ∆, we have
≤ sup
where (14) follows from A 1 < A 2 , and in (15) 
Next, we prove (10). For any positive constant ∆, we have
C Proof of Proposition 2
Note that Y (t) monotonically increases from the initial value y. Once Y (t) reached I 2 , V C (x, y) can be reduced to V 0 (x, y). Then, the exercise region agrees with the exercise region for the benchmark problem V 0 (x, y) which is explicitly obtained in Section 2.2.
D Proof of Proposition 3
First, consider the case of
and y ≤ y ′ < I 2 . Using Lemma 1, we have
where the last inequality implies (x ′ , y ′ ) ∈ S C,2,E . This proves that S C,2,E is expressed as (12) with the decreasing function x * C (·). By Proposition 1, we can immediately show that x * C (y) is between the corresponding thresholds in V L (x, y) and V U (x, y). Next, we derive lim y↑I 2 x * C (y). Clearly we have lim y↑I 2 x * C (y) ≥ x * 2 . Here we explain the case of {(A 2 − 1)/(A 1 − 1)} β/(β−1) ≥ I 2 /I 1 . Replace x * 2 with x * 22 in the case of
We have
where L denotes the generating operator of (X(t), Y (t)), i.e.,
Since the general theory of optimal stopping ensures LV C (x, y) − rV C (x, y) ≤ 0 (refer to Peskir and Shiryaev (2006) ), (17) implies that f 2 (x, y) is not equal to V C (x, y) for
x < (C + 1)rI 2 /(A 2 − C − 1) and y < I 2 . In other words, the option is not exercised Figure 6 . We can lead to contradiction as follows. Consider problem
with a finite maturity T . Generally, the exercise region of an American option converges to the region Lf 2 − rf 2 ≤ 0, when the remaining life of the option goes to zero (refer to Detemple (2006) ). Then, because of (17), the exercise region of problem (19) with a finite maturity T converges to {(x, y) ∈ R 2 + | x ≥ (C + 1)rI 2 /(A 2 − C − 1)} when T ↓ 0. Consider the exercise region of problem (8) for a fixed x satisfying x * 2 < x < lim y↑I 2 x * C (y) and y ↑ I 2 . Note that inf{t ≥ 0 | X(t) ≥ x * 2 , Y (t) ≥ I 2 } converges to 0 as y ↑ I 2 . Accordingly, the exercise region of the problem (8) for the fixed x and y ↑ I 2 converges to that of problem (19) with T ↓ 0. This implies that lim y↑I 2 x * C (y) = (C +1)rI 2 /(A 2 −C −1), which contradicts the assumption of (C + 1)
). We can show the continuity of x * C (·) as follows. By Lemma 1 we have the continuity of V C (x, y). Since V C (x, y) and (A 2 − 1)x/r − µ − I 2 − C max(I 2 − y, 0) are both continuous, S C,2,E ∪ S C,2,I is a closed set. Consider any fixed y(< I 2 ). Then, we have lim ϵ↓0 (x * C (y + ϵ), y + ϵ) ∈ S C,2,E , which leads to lim ϵ↓0
is a decreasing function. Thus, we obtain the right-continuity of x * C (·). Now, suppose that there exists y(< I 2 ) satisfying x * C (y) < lim ϵ↓0 x * C (y − ϵ). We can lead to contradiction as the same method as the proof of lim y↑I 2 x * C (y) = max(x * 2 , (C + 1)rI 2 /(A 2 − C − 1)). Consider the exercise region of problem (19) for a fixed x satisfying
)} converges to 0 as ϵ ↓ 0. Then, the exercise region converges to that of problem (19) with
. Thus, we obtain the left-continuity of x * C (·). Lastly, consider the case of A 2 − C − 1 ≤ 0. In this case, we have for any (x, y)
where L is the generating operator defined by (18) and f 2 (x, y) is defined by (16). Since LV C (x, y) − rV C (x, y) ≤ 0 follows from the general theory of optimal stopping, f 2 (x, y)
does not agree with V C (x, y). This implies S C,2,E = ∅. The proof is completed.
E Proof of Proposition 4
Note that V C (x, y) can be reduced to V 0 (x, y) for y ≥ I 2 . In the case of {(
for any y, the problem V L (x, y) has no small-scale expansion region (cf. Section 2.2). This implies that
By (20) and
Note that, in the case of
We have no clear results, but, as seen in the argument above, S C,1,E and S C,1,I may exist within the region 0 ≤ y < I 2 .
F Proof of Proposition 5
Take any (x, y) ∈ S C,1,E and y ′ ∈ [y, I 1 ). By (10) in Lemma 1, we have Lastly, we focus on the case of {(A 2 − 1)/(A 1 − 1)} β/(β−1) < I 2 /I 1 . In this case, it follows from (4) that
for x < x * 1 . Consider the problem V C (x, y) with a initial point (X(0), Y (0)) = (x, y) satisfying x < x * 1 and y ≥ I 1 . For the problem, we can realize the right-hand side of (21) by the stopping time inf{t ≥ 0 | X(t) ≥ x * 1 }. Then, this threshold policy inf{t ≥ 0 | X(t) ≥ x * 1 } is optimal. In other words, min{x ≥ 0 | (x, y) ∈ S C,1,I } = x * 1 holds for any fixed y ≥ I 1 .
G Proof of Proposition 6
We have already proved the properties of S C,2,E in Proposition 3, and, hence, we focus on the properties of S C,1,E below. In the same manner as the proof of Proposition 3, we can show the properties. Define 
